This article advocates for better implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) framework as applied to wind power development, with a particular focus on improving compensatory restoration scaling. If properly enforced, the environmental impacts hierarchy "avoid-minimize-compensate" provides the regulated community with incentives to prevent wildlife and habitat impacts in sensitive areas and, if necessary, compensate for residual impacts through restoration or conservation projects. Given the increase in legislation requiring resource-based environmental compensation, methods for scaling an appropriate quantity and quality of resources are of increasing relevance. I argue that Equivalency Analysis (EA) represents a transparent and quantitative approach for scaling compensation in the case of wind power development. Herein, I identify the economic underpinnings of environmental compensation legislation and identify weaknesses in current scaling approaches within wind power development. I demonstrate how the recently completed REMEDE toolkit, which provides guidance on EA, can inform an improved scaling approach and summarize a case study involving raptor collisions with turbines that illustrates the EA approach. Finally, I stress the need for further contributions from the field of restoration ecology. The success of ex ante compensation in internalizing the environmental costs of wind development depends on the effective implementation of the environmental impacts hierarchy, which must effectively encourage avoidance and minimization over environmental restoration and repair.
The growth of wind development is a call for improving the science of ecological restoration to address this emerging threat to wildlife. Just as carbon emissions are external to fossil fuel production, wildlife impacts represent a spillover effect on a third party (the public) that is external to the private costs of developing wind energy (see also noise and aesthetic impacts). One efficient way to encourage developers to internalize this external effect is through better use of the environmental impacts hierarchy in general and compensatory restoration in particular.
This article argues for the use of Equivalency Analysis (EA) as a method to specify appropriate types and amounts of environmental compensation at wind farms. Before introducing EA in Section "Compensatory Restoration Scaling Using EA," and a case study in Section "Case Study: Equivalency Analysis and Wind Power" I identify the existing policy framework for compensatory restoration (Section "The Environmental Impacts Hierarchy: Avoid-Minimize-Compensate"), examine the economic underpinnings of compensation (Section "Connecting Ecology and Economics: Is Compensation For the Birds?"), and point to the somewhat inadequate scaling approaches used in wind development today (Section "Current Compensatory Restoration for Wind Development"). Section "Improving the Environmental Impacts Hierarchy" identifies improvements to the policy framework to ensure effective use of compensatory restoration.
The Environmental Impacts Hierarchy: Avoid-Minimize-Compensate
The pressure for wind development raises two questions: Where is the best place to put turbines and associated roads/structures to avoid and/or minimize impacts on wildlife and habitat? And how to compensate for residual environmental impacts if/when they occur?
Both questions are addressed through Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) associated with wind development, where guidance documents suggest the "avoid-minimize-compensate" hierarchy (e.g. Langston & Pullan 2003; WTGAC 2010) . The objective is to prioritize avoidance and/or minimization of environmental impacts through proper siting, operational constraints, etc. Because some environmental impacts are unavoidable for otherwise socially beneficial projects, the EIA framework allows for compensation to offset residual impacts on species and/or habitat. The objective of compensatory restoration (called compensatory mitigation in the U.S.) is to rehabilitate or restore the quantity or quality of resources that is lost or diminished.
Connecting Ecology and Economics: Is Compensation For the Birds?
Environmental economists suggest that social welfare depends on, among other things, access to natural resources and the services they provide. Damage to resources or services leads to welfare losses, which may be addressed through environmental compensation (Dunford et al. 2004) . Thus, compensation is not for the birds but for society in the sense that the success of environmental compensation is judged by whether it addresses the "social welfare" metric (Because the expression for the birds refers to something that is "objectionable or not worth doing," the double meaning in this article's title is relevant: environmental economics suggests that compensation is worthwhile). Importantly, restoration that offsets welfare losses will almost certainly improve, e.g. bird populations because of society's well-established preference for bird conservation, assuming that society, with the help of ecologists and economists, can meaningfully interpret the impact of ecological protection on its collective well-being. While alternative paradigms motivate ecological restoration based on nature's intrinsic value (Clewell & Aronson 2007) , the starting point for this article is the European Union and U.S. legislation that requires compensation to address social welfare losses (Admittedly, the objective measurement of social welfare is difficult and requires ethical decisions about how to weight the well-being of different individuals in a society, see Johansson 1991) .
Economic compensation is based on the notion that an individual is willing to trade-off different amounts of goods without it affecting his/her overall sense of well-being (Johansson 1991) . The extent to which an individual is willing to trade one good (resource loss) for another (resource gain or money) reveals his/her preferences about what is-and is not-an acceptable trade-off (nonmarket environmental valuation tries to measure how individuals make these trade-offs, see Mitchell & Carson 1989) . Consider a resource-based compensation example. Without economics, an environmental loss could be replaced with an environmental gain on a simple 1:1 ratio: e.g. X birds lost can be replaced with X birds gained. But an economist would assert that the value society places on a bird lost or gained may depend on: (1) timing (a loss/gain in 50 years may be valued lower than a loss/gain that occurs today); (2) type of environmental loss/gain (the public may prefer, for example, on-site restoration gains for contamination losses but off-site conservation gains for development losses);
(3) scarcity (the public may place a higher value on losing the last bird in a population than on losing the first); and/or (4) proximity of compensation (it is often argued that the segment of society that suffers an ecological loss should be the one that benefits from the subsequent compensation). As discussed further in Section "Compensatory Restoration Scaling Using EA," EA is designed to address these interdisciplinary issues: (1) is addressed through discounting (Cole & Kriström 2008) ; (2) can be addressed by measuring public preferences when the resource/service provided through compensation differs from that which was lost (Breffle & Rowe 2002; Thur & Barry 2006; Parsons & Kang 2010) ; and (3) and (4) are addressed through criteria for compensatory project selection (Lipton et al. 2008) .
Further, economic theory suggests that compensation measures ensure efficiency (English et al. 2009 ). Efficiency refers to the production of goods (e.g. wind power) at the lowest possible cost to society, where all costs are included in the production decision. The intent of resource-based compensation requirements is to provide an incentive for developers to internalize the full environmental cost of siting turbines in a particular location. Consider an analogous example. Carson et al. (2003) assert that the costly compensation required of Exxon following the 1989 Valdez oil spill may explain the subsequent reduction in the number of very large oil spills in the U.S. compared to other countries during the 1990s. That is, shipping companies doing business in U.S. waters presumably took new measures to avoid large oil spills, thereby internalizing these previously external environmental costs. Similarly, wind companies will be encouraged to avoid and minimize impacts on sensitive areas if they face the full costs of turbine development.
Because compensatory restoration addresses the loss of resource services and the associated decline in human welfare, scaling requires an interdisciplinary approach (Ozdemiroglu et al. 2009 ). The welfare assessment of environmental damage and subsequent compensation must be made with reference to an ecological baseline, which implies that an economist's estimation of welfare changes requires the language of ecology to characterize expected outcomes. Thus, the scaling of resource-based compensation requires a merging of ecological measurement with the tools and theories of economics. Before explaining how EA fills this interdisciplinary demand, I highlight compensatory scaling approaches used in wind power development today.
Current Compensatory Restoration for Wind Development
Although practiced sporadically, compensatory restoration has been implemented by wind developers in the U.S. and EU to address wildlife and habitat impacts (Smallwood 2008; Solano Partners, Inc. 2009 ). Examples include, among others, acquisition of bird habitat in California (EEI 2007 ) and conservation of land for raptors displaced by wind development in the U.K. (Walker et al. 2005) .
In my opinion, current restoration scaling fails to make a connection between the extent of damage and the amount of compensation. For example, the amount of habitat conservation to offset avian collisions in California is scaled based on the "rotor-swept area of a turbine" (EEI 2007) or the megawatts generated (CCC 2005) rather than relevant collision factors and expected restoration gains to the public. Other compensatory schemes are laudable for conserving habitat, but fail to justify specific acreages using quantification metrics (e.g. a monetary or non-monetary currency). In other cases, wind proponents may fund a restoration project that would have been funded by a government agency, thus failing to provide additional environmental gains to the public.
While these "compensation" efforts are well intentioned, I argue that scaling should be based on ecological and economic measurement to be sure the public is compensated. Below, I briefly summarize EA as an improved scaling methodology and illustrate its principles with a case study.
Compensatory Restoration Scaling Using EA
Under some U.S. and European statutes, compensatory restoration is mandatory following environmental accidents (ex post). The practice of measuring appropriate amounts of compensation, referred to as scaling, has evolved over the last 30 years in the U.S. (English et al. 2009 ). Since the mid-1990s, the primary scaling method has been EA, a quantitative approach that ensures equivalence between the environmental loss and subsequent gain (compensation) (Unsworth & Bishop 1994; Jones & Pease 1997; Zafonte & Hampton 2007) . For example, resource trustees in the U.S. rely on Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) or Resource Equivalency Analysis (REA) to determine how much is enough compensation (NOAA 1995) . Compensation is now frequently required (or provided voluntarily) before undertaking infrastructure projects (ex ante). However, to this author's knowledge, wind power compensation has not yet been scaled using EA.
Owing to the demand for compensatory scaling under the EU's Environmental Liability, Habitats, and EIA Directives, the EU funded REMEDE, a 3-year interdisciplinary project to formalize the EA approach in a toolkit (Lipton et al. 2008) . I argue that the toolkit's five-step process, which is based on ecological and economic measurement, represents a transparent, consistent, and defensible approach that can be replicated across (wind) development projects.
EA determines how much compensation is required to offset welfare losses due to environmental damage by ensuring that the value of the environmental gain (credit) is equivalent to the value of the environmental loss (debit) over time, where value is a function of the metric used and the length of time the resource is injured (Fig. 1a & 1b ). The metric, or "currency" of restoration, may be monetary or ecologically based. A temporal loss in social welfare accrues because a resource takes time to recover to its baseline level as in Fig. 1a (see also time discrepancy in the study by Moilanen et al. 2008) . To ensure the public suffers "no net loss" of welfare over time, EA scales compensatory resource gains such that the figures' two shaded areas are equal. EA assumes the public is willing to substitute the value gained from a restored, enhanced, or protected resource for the temporal loss in value of the damaged resource.
The credit (Fig. 1b) represents an additional and quantifiable compensatory resource gain beyond the restoration site's current and future baseline condition. Without generating additional gains, losses are not offset, leading to a "net loss" of social welfare. In general, there are two mechanisms for achieving an additional gain: restoration (including rehabilitation, enhancement, re-creation) or conservation (including preservation or protection). Wetland mitigation policy in the United States aims for "no net loss" and explicitly prefers restoration over conservation (FIMW 2002) . Conservation arguably provides a credit in certain circumstances, although it may not address aggregate resource loss over time nor be useful in conservation-saturated areas. If a habitat will be lost under a future baseline scenario involving development, then conserving this land by sending development to less sensitive areas would arguably lead to compensatory resource gains (Kiesecker et al. 2009 ). Assuming both mechanisms would offset a given temporal loss, an interdisciplinary EA might incorporate public preferences in selecting either restoration or conservation (see Section "Connecting Ecology and Economics: Is Compensation For the Birds?"). However, land acquisition can be an expensive compensation strategy in some urban and coastal areas.
Case Study: Equivalency Analysis and Wind Power
Cole (2010) presents a quantitative, yet hypothetical EA case study to illustrate compensatory scaling in the case of Whitetailed Eagle (WTE) (Haliaeetus albicilla) collisions with wind turbines at the Smøla wind farm in Norway. The study, which follows the five-step REMEDE process, considers the number of WTE collisions over time (past and projected losses), and quantifies the debit and credit using a "birdyear" non-monetary metric (Zafonte & Hampton 2005) . This metric, which acts as a currency in measuring appropriate compensation, quantifies a bird's foregone life expectancy in years had it not collided with a turbine. For example, a 5-year-old WTE that collides with a turbine would have lived approximately 25 more years based on life-history characteristics. The debit-measured as total discounted birdyears lost-includes both direct losses for WTEs that collide and indirect losses for offspring not born and captures the local incremental impact of turbines on top of existing humancaused mortality, e.g. electrocution, illegal hunting, habitat loss. Similar approaches have been used to scale compensation for bird losses in the U.S. (Swartzman 1996; Sperduto et al. 2003; IEc 2004) .
A restoration project is selected based on factors limiting the WTE population. Table 1 identifies possible projects and the data required to quantify the bird-year gain. Cole (2010) illustrates the credit calculations by examining power line retrofitting near the wind farm aimed at preventing WTE electrocution. By estimating the current extent of electrocution mortality in the restoration project area-and making assumptions about the reduction in mortality associated with the retrofit project-the study calculates the discounted birdyears produced ("saved") per retrofitted pole, accounting for the remaining life expectancy of a WTE had it not been electrocuted (we assume retrofitting would not be undertaken in the absence of our compensatory project). Compensatory restoration is scaled by dividing the total bird-years lost (debit) by the bird-years produced per retrofitted pole, which gives the number of poles to retrofit today to ensure equivalence over time between debit and credit. The use of bird-years assumes that the change in this ecological metric-both loss and gain-is proportional to the change in society's welfare. The transparency of the EA approach is manifested through the exchange of the same restoration "currency" across the loss and the gain side of the equation (quantified using ecological data), which is independent of the compensatory project selected from Table 1 .
Improving the Environmental Impacts Hierarchy
Under U.S. and EU statutes requiring ex post compensation, economic incentives-in the form of penalties, fines, and clean-up requirements-encourage operators to prioritize damage prevention (avoidance/minimization) over environmental repair (compensation). In contrast, ex ante compensation schemes (e.g. wind power) prefer avoidance/minimization over repair but lack the economic incentives to steer project proponents toward the former rather than the latter; that is there are no penalties or fines for failing to adequately avoid Table 1 . Examples of compensatory projects (credit) a that could be scaled using EA to offset WTE mortality from wind turbines.
Category Compensatory Project Data Required to Quantify Gain
Reduce threats to species Retrofit power lines to reduce electrocution Current mortality from power lines and future reduction from retrofitting Fund measures to prevent/reduce train collisions Current mortality from collisions and future reduction from measures Fund campaign to educate hunters/lawmakers about impact of lead shot on WTE Current mortality from lead and future reduction from campaign Improve breeding opportunities Conserve and protect key habitat areas Additional raptor production in protected versus non-protected areas Restore habitat lands already protected but degraded Additional raptor production in restored versus non-restored areas Build artificial nests in trees or on cliffs Additional raptor production in artificial versus adjacent natural nests Improve breeding success Protect (or enhance) WTE nests from predators or human disturbance Additional raptor production in protected versus adjacent natural nests Other
Reintroduce WTE to previously occupied areas Population increase in re-introduction area b a Based on factors limiting WTE populations (Helander & Stjernberg 2003) . b Assumes chicks in source population would have died due to sibling competition, ensuring global population gain. or minimize. The lack of proper incentives makes it difficult to integrate the "avoid-minimize-compensate" hierarchy into coherent EIA guidance. As a result, existing ex ante compensation projects are generally ad hoc and the compensation component of the hierarchy is vulnerable to misuse (see "license to trash" in the study by . Thus, ex ante compensation schemes should better define (1) how much avoidance/minimization is enough? ) and
(2) when and how much compensation is required? I address these issues below.
First and foremost, we should improve the transparency and credibility of the EIA process by improving our understanding of environmental impacts at proposed wind development sites (GAO 2005) . This will reduce the uncertainties associated with (1) estimating future compensation requirements today and (2) identifying which impacts should be avoided/minimized and which can be addressed through compensation. Solano Partners, Inc. (2009) suggests that the lack of clear guidance on allowable levels of impact and required amounts of compensation-a key complaint from the wind industry-is due to our poor understanding of wind power's environmental impacts. This lack of knowledge makes cost-effective management of such impacts challenging. Thus, we should strive at a minimum for mandatory pre-and post-construction monitoring surveys (Kunz et al. 2007) . Site-specific data should be collected cooperatively between wildlife agencies, local ecological experts, and developers, and made publically available so that other wind proposals can be reviewed in light of these data (C. Maisonneuve 2009, Quebec MNR, personal communication) ; see also AWWI (2010) for a promising development in this regard. Finally, when data are diligently collected but unforeseen impacts arise, they could be addressed through ex post compensation (see recommendations in WTGAC 2010, Chapter 4) .
To address the issue of how much avoidance is enough, we could incorporate society's preferences for avoidance over compensation directly into the environmental loss calculation. In practice, this would imply a higher marginal value for each lost unit (e.g. bird-year), such that the value of the temporal loss (debit) increases exponentially (J. Dwyer, 2009, Virginia Tech, personal communication) . A larger debit requires greater (and more costly) compensation, making avoidance more attractive (In theory, the marginal value could increase until we reach society's "unacceptable" level of damage-at this point, the debit is infinite and cannot be compensated. Avoidance is the only option). An economic survey of the public could measure the intensity of society's preferences, e.g. how they trade-off bird losses from turbines against bird gains from compensation projects.
The implementation of the impacts hierarchy could be improved through a "reclamation fund" that wind power companies pay into prior to development. Funds are used only if damage occurs and returned (with interest) in the absence of future damage, where damage is defined in a pre-construction contract. Similar funds exist to compensate for losses associated with reduced migratory fish runs from hydropower production (BPA 2010) . Similarly, oil producers/importers in the U.S. pay into a fund to cover costs of, among other things, compensatory restoration when damage exceeds liability limits (USCG 2006) . A fund provides firms with an incentive to undertake avoidance and mitigation measures to ensure recapturing of reclamation funds, while also ensuring the public receives compensation for any possible future environmental losses.
Finally, we need to improve our ability to restore affected populations and damaged ecological systems-a key challenge for readers of this journal. This requires mandatory reporting of post-restoration monitoring to determine what works, what does not, and how much it costs. This journal's new focus on "failed" projects is an important effort in this regard (Hobbs 2009 ), as is the evidence-based approach to conservation (http://www.conservationevidence.com). Wilkinson et al. (2009) note that the future of compensatory restoration will require cooperation across scientists, agencies, and developers through comprehensive region-wide projects, which may provide greater ecological benefits at a lower cost to society.
Implications for Practice
• Compensatory restoration activity is increasing in Europe and the U.S.-based either on new legal requirements or on the voluntary action of the regulated community. • The EIA process for constructing a wind farm includes provisions for compensatory restoration, and thus an opportunity to improve the science and practice of ecological restoration. • EA represents a transparent and quantitative method to match loss and gain in scaling compensatory restoration. Its use of an ecological or monetary metric ("currency") can be used to improve existing compensation efforts by the wind industry. • The success of EA within wind development requires expertise from restoration ecologists. Besides innovative restoration projects for raptors and bats, practitioners should consider region-wide compensatory projects that dovetail with wildlife action plans. • Compensatory restoration aimed at improving social welfare underscores the importance of measuring ecological change so that the public can understand how such changes affect their well-being. • The objective of the "avoid-minimize-compensate" hierarchy is to prevent damage from occurring rather than repairing it afterwards, but doing so requires that (wind) project proponents internalize all external costs of their projects, including the temporal loss to the public.
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